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Background and options 
in the current situation 
by Pedro Sáinz* 
Since 1973, the Latin American countries have had 
to adjust to a world economy and a world trade situa-
tion which are characterized by slow growth and 
instability in the central countries. Between 1974 
and 1980, the region managed to remain relatively 
dynamic, considering the internal circumstances. 
Most governments seemed to take the attitude that 
the crisis was mainly conjunctural in nature, al-
though they did acknowledge the existence of some 
structural elements as well. 
In 1981 and 1982, as the signs of recession were 
accentuated, it became obvious that there were cer-
tain aspects of the crisis of the central countries that 
were definitely structural in nature. The region suf-
fered simultaneously the 'impacts' of the deteriora-
tion of the terms of trade, the rise of protectionism 
and the increase of interest rates on an external debt 
which had grown excessively, especially as regards 
the short-term component thereof. 
The author presents background information 
which should be useful in the redefinition of policies 
which is made necessary by the situation. It has now 
become evident that marginal changes will not suf-
fice; the magnitude of the challenge has proved 
them to b e of little use when they have been at-
tempted. Hence the need to gather background in-
formation on the structural aspects of the situation. 
Although in some ways the crisis is similar to 
that of the 1930s, there can be no question that today 
the region is quite different and that international 
relations are also different. The author therefore 
makes an assessment of the 1970s in order to reach 
conclusions regarding the structural conditions that 
exist at the beginning of the 1980s. 
H e then presents a brief description of the 
problems facing governments under the current cir-
cumstances. He also outlines two prototypes of 
policy options based on whether the crisis is consi-
dered to b e conjunctural or structural in nature. 
Finally, taking the long-term standpoint the 
author examines certain elements pertaining to 
economic dynamism, income distribution, external 
economic relations and the sectoral structure that 
should provide the framework within which econo-
mic policies for the situation may be outlined. 
Introduction** 
The serious economic situation in which most 
of the Latin American countries find them-
selves at the beginning of the 1980s is causing 
them to make more or less profound changes in 
their economic policies. 
During the crisis of the 1930s, the coun-
tries applied certain economic policies which 
greatly influenced the subsequent develop-
ment of the region; today, in the face of a di-
lemma in which some of the important features 
of that time appear to be reproduced, it seems 
essential to gather as much useful information 
as possible in order to study what policies 
should be applied in dealing with the current 
crisis. 
In this paper, three types of information 
are discussed. First, an appraisal is made of the 
economic aspects of the 1970s; the results of 
this appraisal provide some of the data which 
must initially be borne in mind in designing a 
policy for the 1980s. Different positions have 
been taken vis-à-vis these results by those who 
stress the importance of transforming produc-
tion and finding new forms of international in-
sertion and those who emphasize the fact 
that structural problems still remain. For this 
reason, the first section is devoted to a review 
and assessment of the appraisals of the devel-
opment process that were made during the 
1970s, considering that we are now in a better 
position to look back at the decade as a whole. 
In the second section, the current situation 
is discussed and an analysis is made of the 
factors that brought about the crisis, the main 
problems arising from it which require short-
term solutions, and two strategic options to be 
used in considering the possible orientation of 
conjunctural economic policies. 
Finally, some of the components that 
should be included in a conjuntural policy are 
explored from the standpoint of a vision of de-
*Deputy Director of the Economic Projections Centre 
of CEPAL. 
**The author is grateful for the helpful comments and 
suggestions made by Claudio Marinho, Adolfo Currieri, 
Arturo Núñez de l Prado and his colleagues in the Econo-
mic Projections Centre of CEPAL. The views expressed 
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velopment which is aimed at solving the main 
structural problems that remain despite the 
sometimes profound changes that have taken 
place in the region. 
I 
Appraisals of development during the 1970s 
A review of the numerous appraisals of the de-
velopment process of the Latin American coun-
tries that were made during the 1970s will al-
low us to make some comments that might be 
useful in designing policies for the 1980s. 
Since different conclusions were reached in 
the different appraisals, we must in the first 
place set forth some of the criteria on which 
they were based. We shall then present the main 
conclusion of these appraisals, distinguishing 
between those which stress the successes 
achieved and those which refer mainly to neg-
ative results. This section concludes with an 
overall evaluation of the trends noted during 
the 1970s, for which we are able to take advant-
age of the hindsight we now enjoy. 
1. Criteria used in making the appraisals 
The diversity of the conclusions reached in 
the different evaluations is to a large extent a 
measure of the differences between the various 
criteria on which they were based. 
The dimension of time is one of the most 
important of these criteria, as many of the eval-
uations were aimed at assessing the results of 
short-term economic policies. The conjunc-
t u r e nature of these exercises is shown by the 
fact that they attribute a central role to the re-
sults obtained in aspects such as inflation, open 
unemployment or variations in the reserves. 
Other appraisals, on the other hand, concen-
trated on the structural aspects, assessing the 
changes brought about over the medium and 
long term and attributing special importance to 
factors such as the transformation of produc-
tion, technological and social change and the 
nature of external economic relations. 
The influence of time-oriented approaches 
in the évaluation of results becomes evident 
when one takes into consideration the sharp 
contrasts between different periods of the 
1970s as regards short-term indicators —for ex-
ample, in the economic growth and balance-of-
payments series— and the factors implicit in 
those indicators, such as the international eco-
nomic situation, socio-political organization 
and the principles guiding the international 
economy. 
The model or pattern used as a standard for 
each appraisal also helps establish the differ-
ences between them. In this regard, there is 
great diversity: the evolution of the Latin Amer-
ican countries during the 1970s is compared 
with previous periods, or with what happened 
in the central countries, or even with para-
digms taken from Marxism, neoliberalism or 
the CEPAL view of development. 
Finally, another important criterion is that 
of the scope of the appraisal, which may be 
wide ranging and not be broken by social 
groups, if the object of die appraisal is the 
'country as a whole', or, on the other hand, it 
may have a different scope if it assesses the 
situation of one or several specific social 
groups. 
In considering the conclusions which are 
discussed below, it is important to bear in mind 
the differences between the criteria used and 
not to forget that the past decade was character-
ized by its contrasts. At the temporal level, 
there was a succession of periods of economic 
boom, contraction and uncertainty. As regards 
the orientation of policies, there was a wide 
variety of schemes, some of which were based 
on doctrines as disparate as Marxism and neo-
liberalism, and the contrast between the results 
obtained by different countries and social 
groups is no less sharp. Hence, in considering 
the successes and failures of the decade, it must 
be borne in mind that no general conclusions 
can be applied without proper study to any 
particular country. 
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2. Positive and negative findings in 
the appraisals of the 1970s 
In the compilation of findings which fol-
lows, emphasis is placed on aspects of a struc-
tural nature. Although short-term results are 
also considered, those aspects have been selec-
ted which have persisted long enough to be 
viewed as conditions which might be carried 
over into the 1980s. 
The positive aspects set forth in the apprai-
sals show that, despite the difficulties encoun-
tered, economic growth did consolidate some 
productive, technological and institutional 
changes which, from the perspective of post-
war proposals, unquestionably represent pro-
gress. 
The most notable of these are the follow-
ing: 
(a) The great dynamism achieved by many 
countries of the region in the early 1970s. The 
growth rate of the regional product had been 
accelerating since the mid-1960s and during 
the early years of the 1970s the region's tre-
mendous potential for growth was reaffirmed. 
In some countries and for some products, mar-
kets were large enough to create dynamic 
spaces suitable for carrying out efficient pro-
jects having broad scales of production. 
(b) The relatively intense process of in-
vestment and productive and technological 
transformation in some of the regional econo-
mies which was reflected in the appearance of 
new branches of industry and modern agricul-
tural and service enterprises, and in the expan-
sion of the infrastructure. However, and espe-
cially in this regard, the disparities between 
countries were considerable. 
(c) The capacity of the economic policy to 
seek new forms of insertion in the international 
economy. From the beginning of the 1970s, 
most of the external conditions created during 
that decade were reconciled with the trans-
formation of production in order to alter the 
structure of exports, diversifying the basket of 
basic commodities at die national level and in-
creasing its content of manufactures; men, 
when international liquidity increased, large 
amounts of external financing were attracted. 
For the period 1975-1981, the medium-term 
growth rates of the volume of exports rose in 
most of the countries to the highest levels of the 
postwar period. This adjustment to the chang-
ing conditions of the international economy 
was often interpreted as a guarantee of the re-
gion's capacity to deal with difficult external 
situations. The policy followed made it possi-
ble to take advantage, depending on the cir-
cumstances, of the positive conditions of world 
trade or the abundant availability of financial 
resources. 
(d) The capacity of the State to improve 
the operation of the markets, to modernize tax 
and financial structures, to establish and man-
age efficiently State enterprises that play a key 
role in the transformation of production, to 
maintain the major economic balances within 
acceptable ranges and to raise significantly the 
shares of the product earmarked for domestic 
savings and for investment. 
(e) The resilience shown by many Latin 
American economies in preserving, after 1974, 
their overall industrial and economic dyna-
mism, despite the limited growth of the central 
countries. Some Latin American countries kept 
their industrial transformation on the course 
previously followed, reducing the relative im-
portance of the branches producing non-dura-
ble consumer goods and increasing that of the 
intermediate and metal-mechanical industries. 
This evolution made it possible, in many cases, 
to deal with the balance-of-payments problems 
through import substitution and the expansion 
of exports of manufactures. At any rate, it 
should be noted that die trend in another group 
of countries1 was highly negative during the 
period under consideration. 
The positive aspects noted above were 
countered by the inability of the region to alter 
long-standing social imbalances and imbal-
ances in external relations. 
Some of the main negative aspects stressed 
in the appraisals are die following: 
(a) Contrary to expectations, dynamism 
and productive transformation were not suffi-
cient to prevent the development of extremely 
unjust societies having a high concentration of 
1
 Argentina, Chile, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Panama 
and Peru. 
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wealth and income, high unemployment rates 
and a large segment of the population living in 
poverty. A significant part of the transformation 
of production was channelled towards meeting 
the consumption requirements of the high in-
come strata, strengthening the transnational 
corporations and thus giving rise to a highly 
dependent technology and to balance-of-pay-
ments problems.2 
(b) The rate of economic growth noted in 
most of the Latin American countries during 
the second half of the 1970s declined and its 
recovery seemed limited by factors of instabil-
ity and uncertainty which were to a large extent 
linked to external variables. 
(c) Despite the progress made, the trans-
formation of production did not include a suffi-
cient degree of vertical integration; this is evi-
dent in the lag in the production of interme-
diate and capital goods. The inadequate degree 
of internalization and technological devel-
opment played a major role in this lag. At the 
same time, the meagre success of the efforts 
made to find formulas for bringing the interests 
of the transnational corporations in line with 
those of the Latin American countries has made 
it even more difficult to solve these problems. 
(d) The structure of external relations is 
still asymmetrical, both as regards the nature of 
the flow of exports and imports and as regards 
the unfavourable trend in the terms of trade in 
the non-oil-exporting countries ; to this is added 
the external indebtedness, its real and financial 
effects on the real national income, and the 
deterioration of the balance of payments. All 
this leads to an extremely vulnerable and unsta-
ble economic growth process. 
In view of many authors, the accentuation 
of this asymmetry is due to a large extent to the 
transnationalization of the economies. The role 
of the transnational corporations is increasing 
in importance and many of the economic flows 
recorded as flows between States actually take 
place within a single economic agent which 
acts independently of national boundaries. 
2
 See, for example, Luis Claudio Marinho, "The trans-
national corporations and Latin America's present form of 
economic growth", in CEPALReview No. 14, August 1981. 
3. The appraisals viewed from the perspective 
of the 1980s 
The successes and failures noted in the 
appraisals made during the 1970s may now be 
re-interpreted from the improved perspective 
of the 1980s. Thus, we shall examine the con-
tinuing validity of these findings, the positive 
factors carried over from the 1970s into the 
1980s, and the problems of the early 1980s 
which remain unsolved. This will enable us to 
make some preliminary comments. 
In the first place, underlying many con-
junctival appraisals is the external situation 
which often is not considered explicit enough 
during boom periods and the impact of which is 
underestimated during difficult periods. Be-
cause of the difficult international economic 
situation, in many countries the optimism of 
the early 1970s began to pale and by the end of 
the decade had changed to pessimism. During 
the triennium 1971-1973, the rapid growth of 
world markets and the improvement of the 
terms of trade created a feeling of optimism 
regarding the possibilities that were opening 
up for the countries of the region. As a long-
standing policy of industrialization and moder-
nization matured, most of the countries were 
able to support a new and more diversified 
export structure that included increasing per-
centages of manufactured goods; as they were 
freed from the restrictions brought about by a 
relatively rigid external supply, they were able 
notably to accelerate their economic growth. 
Beginning in 1974, the external situation 
began gradually to deteriorate, especially in 
the non-oil-exporting countries. Nevertheless, 
an abundance of external financing and a rap-
id increase in exports made it possible to main-
tain external balance; the countries were thus 
able to keep their imports at acceptable levels 
and, in this way, to sustain the level of internal 
activity. Towards the end of the 1970s, both 
these mechanisms began to lose their effective-
ness. On the one hand, the rapid growth of the 
debt and the changes in credit terms and in-
terest rates meant that interest and amortiza-
tion payments absorbed increasing percent-
ages of the purchasing power of exports. On the 
other hand, the deterioration of prices for basic 
commodities eventually counteracted the ef-
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feet of the large increase in the volume of ex-
ports. Moreover, the considerable increase in 
net external financing was accompanied by a 
radical change in the sources of such financing. 
Indeed, from the 1950s to the early 1960s, the 
bulk of capital entering Latin America had 
come from official sources, with long repay-
ment terms, and, part of it consisted of direct 
investments. During the 1970s, on the other 
hand, a large share of such financing came from 
private banks and commercial sources; it con-
sisted of short and medium-term loans and was 
subject to constantly increasing interest rates. 
The shortening of repayment terms and the rise 
in interest rates increased at the beginning of 
the 1980s, reflecting the fact that the region is 
in a clearly asymmetrical position with regard 
to the international financial markets. 
As a result of this trend, one positive factor 
that remains is the new structure and level of 
exports. Despite the repercussions of the cur-
rent unfavourable situation on the export-ori-
ented sectors of production, in many cases 
markets have been opened up and consoli-
dated and, in macroeconomic terms, the in-
creasing deterioration of the region's share in 
world trade has been stopped. On the negative 
side, it should be noted that the new financial 
insertion has accentuated the asymmetry of ex-
ternal relations and has transferred to the do-
mestic economy, and often increased, the more 
unfavourable effects of the recession of the cen-
tres. 
In the second place, as has been mention-
ed above, the changes in economic policy 
were judged in positive terms —because of the 
role they played with regard to productive 
transformation and external insertion— and in 
' negative terms because of their inability to sol-
ve social problems and because of the continu-
ing asymmetry of external relations. Beyond 
these judgements, it must be stressed that qual-
ity of the management capacity attained during 
the decade, which underlay these successes 
and failures, depended on the orientation of the 
economic policy followed. 
The economic policies of the 1970s com-
bined in very different proportions various 
forms of State intervention, which we shall call 
active and passive. The active ones are those 
which contribute to the strengthening of public 
institutions and public intervention policies. 
Concrete examples of this form of intervention 
are the creation of State enterprises concerned 
with exports (promotion, marketing, financing, 
negotiation and opening up of markets) and 
with production in key sectors of the economy, 
the establishment of policies providing for sub-
sidies and incentives to production, and the 
monitoring of the activities of the transnational 
corporations (including the amounts, terms and 
channelling of external financing). On the 
other hand, the passive forms of intervention 
are those which tend to reduce or eliminate the 
activity of public institutions in order to facili-
tate the action of domestic and foreign private 
agents. Some examples of this are the policies 
providing for the liberalization of foreign trade 
and of the financial sector and the opening up 
of the financial sector to the international 
banks. 
A study of the Latin American countries 
will reveal the distinction between those poli-
cies where the active elements were predomi-
nant and those where the passive elements 
were predominant. Although some hold the 
View that there was no substantial difference 
between them, because of the decisive in-
fluence of external agents on State action, it 
should be stressed that the economic results 
were clearly different.3'4 
The countries which applied mostly active 
forms of intervention during the period 1974-
1979 followed a State policy aimed at promot-
ing industrialization and the modernization of 
other sectors. This policy was aimed at co-ordi-
nating the recent insertion into the internation-
al economy with the expansion of production. 
Thus, part of the investment in industry was 
oriented towards taking advantage of both do-
mestic and external markets, external financing 
3Ten Latín American countries representing nearly 
half the population of Latin America in 1975, in which the 
State plays an important role in industry, either through 
direct action or through promotion, achieved average an-
nual growth rates in the manufacturing sector of between 
5.7% and 12.1%. 
4
 According to other criteria, the spread of transnation-
als has also been classified as either active or passive. See, 
for example, Raúl Trajtenberg and Raúl Vigorito, "Econo-
mía y política en la fase transnacional: reflexiones prelimi-
nares", in Comercio Exterior, Vol. 32, No. 7, Mexico, July 
1982. 
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or surpluses were used to support a relatively 
explicit productive transformation project and, 
in general, the financial sector was better ba-
lanced with the productive sector, when it was 
not subordinated to it. Despite the feet that the 
change in the international scene ofthe 1980s 
produced a disarticulation of mis policy and 
prevented most of the countries following it 
from maintaining their previous growth rates, 
there is no question that the organization ofthe 
State places them in a better position to esta-
blish development policies than is the case 
with those countries where the passive forms of 
intervention were predominant. 
In the third place, despite the disparity 
between countries and periods, it was clearly 
shown that the region possesses a considerable 
potential for transformation and economic 
growth. In certain periods —for example 1970-
1974— the region grew at rates of close to 
7.2%,5 thus demonstrating its great capacity to 
absorb investment and to balance the growth of 
domestic and external savings. Throughout the 
decade, certain productive branches ofthe in-
dustrial sector were strengthened, part of the 
agricultural sector was technified and diversi-
fied, and commercial and financial services 
were modernized. 
In many appraisals, die view is taken that 
most of these transformations, as well as the 
economic dynamism, were brought about by 
internal and external economic agents which 
used the changes to gain greater control over 
the rest of the society. This is not the view 
expressed in other appraisals, which dispute 
the statistical quality of the indicators used to 
measure the concentration of income and of 
wealth or consider concentration as an inevi-
table stage in the process of growth and econo-
mic transformation. What should be stressed 
here is that, even if one accepts the first view, it 
seems reasonable to hold that the point of de-
parture makes it possible to reach higher levels 
of production with a more complex structure. 
Moreover, since an appreciable percentage of 
the infrastructure and ofthe productive capac-
ity created can be used in a relatively flexible 
5
 Estimated at 1975 prices. Taking into account only the 
non-oil-exporting countries, the annual growth rate was 
over 7.5%. 
manner, they may also be useful in very diffe-
rent development patterns. 
In brief, with a higher material base and 
with the region's demonstrated potential for 
economic growth, it is possible to think in 
terms of much more ambitious development 
strategies based to a greater degree on the in-
ternal development capacity ofthe countries. 
Nevertheless, and in the fourth place, the 
most important conclusion to be drawn, from 
the perspective of 1982, is concerned with the 
persistence ofthe structural problems of Latin 
America. The deterioration of external condi-
tions showed that: 
(a) The changes which took place in com-
mercial and financial relations did not change 
the asymmetry of external relations, but instead 
strengthened it. 
(b) Economic dynamism did not create 
the internal foundations the region needed to 
protect itself to a reasonable degree from the 
periods of sharp depression in the centres. Be-
tween 1974 and 1980, the region seemed to have 
attained a degree of autonomy that would en-
able it to maintain relatively high growth rates, 
although it was affected by the fluctuations in 
the centres and in their growth rates. Events 
have shown that external indebtedness had 
played a greater role in creating this presumed 
protective capacity than had been acknowl-
edged in many appraisals. 
(c) The inequality in the distribution of 
political and economic power among the vari-
ous social groups has either continued or in-
creased; likewise, the inequitable nature of 
Latin American societies has been evident in 
the distribution ofthe costs ofthe crisis. 
These preliminary remarks provide some 
background on the issues that should be con-
sidered in designing a strategy for the 1980s. 
On the one hand, the structural problems have 
persisted, albeit under new conditions and in 
new institutions; macroeconomic and institu-
tional tools put into use through existing public 
and market mechanisms are in and of them-
selves inadequate to overcome social ineq-
uities, the high degree of dependence on the 
exterior and the instability and vulnerability of 
economic growth. 
Moreover, the region might lean more 
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heavily than it has to date on its internal poten-
tial for growth and transformation. A material 
and institutional base has been created which, 
if used for other goals, could significantly re-
duce the problems affecting the most backward 
strata of Latin American societies. The poten-
tial for development which this material base 
provides could be considerably reinforced if 
the countries utilized it in a more co-ordinated 
fashion; this in turn would enable them appre-
ciably to increase their autonomy with respect 
to the exterior. 
II 
The current situation 
1. Background of the current crisis 
Having explored the positive and negative 
long-term aspects of the trends noted during 
the 1960s, we must now look at the current 
situation from the short-term viewpoint. 
The crisis which began in 1981 and was in 
full swing during 1982 originated from external 
disequilibria. The region had satisfactorily 
withstood the sharp deceleration of growth in 
the developed countries between 1974 and 
1980, but the policies used then did not bring 
success in dealing with the current crisis. 
Several factors worked together to bring 
about the current situation of sharp external 
disequilibrium. As mentioned previously, the 
region had been dealing with its external prob-
lems through both an increased indebtedness 
and an accelerated growth of exports. The sec-
ond rise in oil prices and the new economic 
policies of the Reagan administration in the 
United States, among other factors, affected the 
growth of the value of exports because of the 
drop in real demand and in prices. Moreover, 
the export promotion mechanisms that had 
been operating actively to take advantage of the 
strengthening of productive capacity turned 
out to be inadequate because of the increasing 
protectionism of the centres. Then, die rise in 
interest rates significantly increased the cost of 
servicing the external debt. These events oc-
curred at a time when the level and the profile 
of indebtedness had already, in 1978,6 led 
CEPAL to foresee that it would be impossible 
6See, for example, "Tendencias y proyecciones de lar-
go plazo del desarrollo económico de América Latina", 
Cuadernos de la CEPAL, Santiago, Chile. 1978. 
to maintain the trend of the second half of die 
1970s. Indeed, it would have been difficult to 
maintain the ratio between the service of die 
debt and the value of exports in view of die 
situation with regard to the external demand, 
interest rates and overdue loans. 
The external disequilibrium was transfer-
red to die Latin American economies by mech-
anisms that either did not exist or were not 
widely disseminated in the early 1970s. During 
the 1970s, the region was rapidly integrated 
into the international financial system under 
circumstances which were clearly asymmetri-
cal. The loans received from international pri-
vate banks were transferred to the national pro-
ductive sectors quite flexibly, although some-
times on unfavourable terms. Thus, a high per-
centage of Latin American enterprises was di-
rectly subject to the conditions of the interna-
tional financial markets and to fluctuations in 
the exchange rate. Likewise, in 1981 and 1982, 
the international financial crisis and die exter-
nal disequilibria of the countries also affected 
certain sectors that had very few trade links 
with the exterior. 
As the seriousness of the situation became 
evident, there began in 1981 a gradual disar-
ticulation of the policies that had made possi-
ble the type of external insertion that was typi-
cal of the 1970s. There was a spate of devalua-
tions, rises in tariffs and other measures aimed 
at palliating the external commercial disequi-
librium, although the increased efforts to pro-
tect the countries with regard to external trade 
has deepened the financial crisis for many en-
terprises. The ambivalent impact of these mea-
sures on business has made it necessary to take 
additional action, such as the creation of diffe-
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rential exchange rates for the payment of debts 
and different types of moratoria or State sub-
sidies for debtors. 
The economic situation varies from one 
Latin American country to another. In most of 
them, the external disequilibria go hand in 
hand with a drop in the level of economic 
activity and, in some cases, there are also sharp 
increases in inflation or unprecedented levels 
of unemployment. Despite diese differences, 
action by the public sector is increasing every-
where without regard to ideological considera-
tions, and a new economic situation is begin-
ning to take shape in which there is an altera-
tion both of the distribution of functions as be-
tween the public and private sectors and in the 
economic parameters within which the agents 
must act. Latin American economic history 
once again shows how much depends on the 
direction and magnitude of public action in this 
type of crisis. 
In view of the above, it is worthwhile to 
summarize those problems that are perceived 
as urgent in the current situation and look at the 
framework in which they are viewed and the 
strategy to be chosen in dealing with them. 
In a crisis situation, there are usually cer-
tain imbalances, financial or real, external or 
internal, of such a magnitude that it becomes 
essential to find a quick solution to them; what 
is important is to remember that such a solution 
is far from being the only one and that die 
solution adopted will have quite a different 
effect on the structural problems faced by the 
economies. Thus, the consistency of the short-
term policy will depend on the long-term vi-
sion with which the numerous emergencies 
characteristic of such situations are met. 
2. Short-term public action 
As has been mentioned repeatedly, the 
countries are faced with serious structural 
problems that give rise to conjunctural disequi-
libria which are accentuated in times of crisis. 
Some of these conjunctural problems are evi-
dent in almost all the Latin American countries 
and, because of their seriousness, require an 
urgent solution. 
(a) Renegotiation of the debt 
The service of the external debt as envis-
saged for 1982 and 1983 is of such a magnitude 
that it cannot be met, especially in view of the 
circumstances surrounding external trade mat 
are described above. The solution is to renego-
tiate the debt, for the previous situation of 
abundant supply, when new loans amply cov-
ered interest payments, has changed radically. 
Those countries which must cover a substantial 
portion of the debt in one or two years are in the 
most serious trouble; in such cases, the classi-
cal solution of paying the interest and renewing 
the debt does not work and consequently they 
must now replace the current debt with another 
one having a longer term. The conditions for 
renegotiation that the external agents might try 
to impose could reduce a country's manoeuvr-
ing room, therefore, action by the public sector, 
at the national or international level, is essen-
tial in dealing with this problem. 
(b) The crisis of the external financial sector 
Because the internal financial crisis has 
spread to most sectors, many enterprises have 
become insolvent. There has been a mutual 
feedback between the internal financial crisis 
and the slowdown of activity. This has accentu-
ated the problem for business and often the 
market has not offered any solution to the dise-
quilibria other than bankruptcy. A more or less 
profound intervention on the part of the central 
bank is becoming essential to restore the nor-
mal operation of the productive system. 
(c) The depression of the productive system 
The years 1981 and 1982 were character-
ized by a considerable slowdown of economic 
growth and in many countries by a vertical drop 
in the level of the product, so that open unem-
ployment and underemployment have in-
creased notably. Public action is required to 
reduce the deficits on the trade balance, al-
though, since it is quite unlikely that exports 
will increase significantly, there is the problem 
of reducing imports with minimum effect on 
the level of domestic activity. Expenditure 
must be reoriented towards activities that will 
put less pressure on the level of imports and 
imports must be controlled if a level of activity 
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or employment compatible with a non-repres-
sive policy in the political sphere is to be main-
tained. 
(d) The boundary between public and pri-
vate activity 
The degree to which the State does or 
should intervene to deal with the crisis brings 
out in die open a dilemma regarding the protec-
tion of public interests. There are cases when, 
in order to keep an enterprise in operation, the 
public sector must provide, on very favourable 
repayment terms, financial resources that are 
almost equal to the capital of the enterprise. In 
order to guarantee the proper use of such re-
sources, the State must create control mecha-
nisms. When the government provides a large 
proportion of a company's capital and takes 
over central aspects of its administration, the 
borderline between this situation and the man-
agement of a public enterprise becomes hazy. 
In other cases, the operation of the market does 
not suffice to control the imbalance, e.g., with 
regard to crises in the exchange rate, and State 
intervention involves an implicit transfer of 
large amounts of resources between economic 
agents. The use of such resources for purposes 
other than those pursued by the State might be 
contrary to the public interest and changes 
might have to be made in the delimitation of 
the public and private sectors. Finally, during 
periods of crisis it is usually necessary to adopt 
measures that entail great commercial or finan-
cial risk and the private sector is usually not 
prepared to assume those risks under such un-
stable circumstances. In such a situation, the 
government must redefine the boundaries be-
tween the public and the private sectors and 
take emergency measures as well. 
The public sectors facing these conjunc-
tural problems have started out from very diffe-
rent positions, which should be borne in mind 
before strategic options are proposed. There are 
public sectors in which State intervention was 
active during the 1970s and which therefore 
have a vast institutional arsenal in the fields of 
investment, production, finance and external 
trade. Other governmens» however, have con-
centrated their action on the more aggregated 
instruments of macroeconomic policy. Dif-
ferent governments are also in different posi-
tions with regard to the balance of payments: 
some still have a considerable export potential 
while others seem to have reached the limits of 
their installed capacity. There are also con-
trasts in the capacity for reducing imports and 
in the relative importance and the profile of the 
debt and the service thereof. Despite the afore-
mentioned disparities, the great majority of 
countries have serious internal and balance-
of-payments problems and the differences 
noted have a bearing more on the possibilities 
for action than on the existence of difficulties. 
3. Long-term frameworks for 
short-term problems 
Because of the many different policy mea-
sures that governments must take to solve the 
wide variety of problems with which they are 
faced, they must devise an overall framework to 
give such policies consistency. Moreover, be-
cause of the very nature of the problems, cer-
tain measures will have to be taken which will 
gradually determine long-term development; 
viewing such measures within a long-term con-
text will make it easier to appreciate their full 
implications. Hence, a long-term framework 
will be essential to the definition and study of 
short-term policy options. 
We shall describe only two types of strate-
gy options to illustrate the long-term considera-
tions on which a short-term position must al-
ways be founded. 
Under the first option, public action is 
guided by the conjunctural approach and the 
attitude towards external circumstances is pas-
sive. This option would be taken by countries 
where the public sector had a limited capacity 
for intervention or those whose governments 
assigned a high value to liberal mechanisms 
and to the operation of die market within those 
mechanisms. When this option is taken, the 
form of external insertion of the 1970s is not 
questioned; rather, the aim is to alter it as little 
as possible with a view to returning to it when 
the central economies —and with them inter-
national trade— recover. 
Within this line of thinking, public inter-
vention must change the allocation of resources 
arising spontaneously from the market as little 
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as possible and new trends must be expressed 
through the market. Thus for example, a deval-
uation should transmit enough internal signals 
to make it possible to reassign resources be-
tween production for the domestic market and 
production for export, making any kind of con-
trol or foreign trade subsidy unnecessary. Mor-
atoria in the payment of the external debt 
should take the form of long-term renegotia-
tions within the parameters of the financial 
market itself and aid to the most seriously af-
fected sectors should not involve profound 
changes in the structure of distribution. In this 
type of option, any discussion is of a practical 
nature, because the central objectives of the 
development pattern are not questioned. The 
inherent primacy of market mechanisms under-
lies this option and interferences in the opera-
tion of those mechanisms are accepted only 
temporarily; they would be considered unne-
cessary in the absence of factors of rigidity such 
as the refusal of entrepreneurs to declare bank-
ruptcy or of workers to accept wage cuts. 
The second option is bases on a different 
interpretation of the situation and involves 
making substantial changes in current develop-
ment patterns. In the view of those who take 
this approach, the current crisis shows once 
again the inability of the central countries to 
maintain a stable growth in the level of world 
activity and trade. The deterioration of the 
terms of trade in the periphery once more 
shows that in the trade of basic commodities 
and industrial goods, those who specialize in 
commodities are at a disadvantage and that it is 
the countries that are better able to protect 
themselves that are in a position to export man-
ufactured goods. The instability of the market 
for basic commodities and the benefits which 
the developed countries obtain from the de-
cline in the terms of trade when the markets 
suffer contraction, are viewed as structural 
characteristics of the present world trade sys-
tem. The fact that the countries of the periphery 
have little or no influence in the establishment 
of real interest rates, the terms under which 
external financing is granted or decisions regard-
ing monetary policy reflects the asymmetry of 
external economic relations. The transmission of 
the high interest rates makes it almost impossible 
to find productive investments that can 
compete with speculative investments and the 
resulting slowdown of domestic economic ac-
tivity and the high unemployment rates of the 
Latin American countries show how extremely 
vulnerable the region is to external conditions. 
Finally, the fact that the system has very little 
capacity to distribute equitably among the dif-
ferent social groups both the cost of the crisis 
and the fruits of the growth of the boom period, 
is a confirmation of its inability to solve the 
problems of distribution. Hence, those who 
take this approach no longer hold to the illusion 
of the early 1970s regarding the productive and 
distributive potential of full insertion in world 
trade or the value attributed subsequently to 
full participation in the new international fi-
nancial system. They do not think that the 
world trade boom of the 1970s can be repeated 
or that external financing can be used to the 
extent, in terms of percentage of the product, 
that it was during the period 1974-1980. Hence, 
they consider that the approach must be diffe-
rent from that of the 1970s and that the ele-
ments of dynamism must be found within the 
Latin American countries and the region. It 
will be important, however, to retain all those 
elements that demonstrated the region's poten-
tial for mobilizing resources and penetrating 
external markets. 
Economic reactivation will thus cease to 
depend solely on the reactivation of the devel-
oped countries. It will depend, first of all, on 
the capacity of public policy to establish more 
stable, dynamic and fair regional and national 
markets and to encourage those activities to 
which priority is assigned. In the second place, 
it will depend on the collective capacity of the 
region to restore suitable external conditions. 
This will involve collective negotiations re-
garding the general terms of external financing 
and protectionism and the building up of more 
effective regional co-operation in the fields of 
trade and finance. 
The establishment of markets is aimed at 
implementing a policy for the redistribution of 
income and consumption that will equitably 
spread out the deterioration of real income and 
guarantee a minimum degree of stability in the 
operation of the market. In order to ensure 
greater stability, it will be important to make 
clear, among other parameters, to what extent 
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domestic activities will be protected or ne-
glected; this also refers to the government's 
attitude regarding changes of policy in the dev-
eloped countries (protectionism and subsi-
dies). 
To guarantee a greater degree of autonomy 
and symmetry in external relations, a long-term 
policy regarding the transformation of produc-
tion must be designed. The State should play 
an important role in the stages of definition and 
execution of such a policy. 
The emphasis given under this option to 
structural issues should not be construed as 
indicating a lack of concern for conjunctural 
problems; on the contrary, the solution of such 
problems should constitute a first step towards 
structural change. Indeed, the new delimita-
tion between the public and private sectors, the 
full or partial operation of market mechanisms, 
the degree of protection given to the produc-
tive sectors, the deliberate action of public 
agencies and enterprises —using indicators 
other than the current erratic prices of world 
trade and real interest rates rather than those of 
late 1981 and early 1982— constitute basic in-
The economic crisis of the period 1981-1982 is 
without a doubt profound and far-reaching. In 
1982, the service of the debt in many countries 
will exceed half the value of exports and the 
situation will deteriorate for as long as the 
prices and volume of exports continue to drop 
while interest rates rise and the proportion of 
the short-term debt increases. Not only is infla-
tion higher than 50% per year in several coun-
tries, it is rising rapidly in most of them, open 
unemployment is in the two-digit range and 
activity is slowing down seriously in many 
branches of the economy. 
The policy measures that are being adop-
ted also give an indication of the seriousness of 
the crisis: one devaluation follows another and 
over a period of one year they amount to or are 
close to 100%, the money stock is growing rap-
idly, tariffs are being raised and high subsidies 
gredients for the solution of the problems per-
taining to reactivation and to the balance of 
payments. 
Thus, under this second option, the cur-
rent crisis is viewed as yet another demonstra-
tion of the inability of the currentforms of inter-
national insertion used by the region to solve 
its structural problems and an active national 
and regional policy is proposed in order to 
bring about fundamental changes in the devel-
opment pattern. 
Finally, it should be mentioned again that 
both the definition of the problem and the pol-
icy options presented in this article are generic 
in nature and do not refer to any country in 
particular. At the national level, both tasks 
should be undertaken with due regard to the 
circumstances that are specific to each country, 
such as its economic and social systems, the 
organization and scope of its public sector, and 
the participation of external economic interests 
as well as to the differences between countries 
as regards size of the population and the eco-
nomy and the availability of resources. 
are being granted to major sectors of the eco-
nomy. 
Under such circumstances, the measures 
that are being taken to deal with the crisis will 
inevitably produce results of a structural na-
ture. Indeed, many branches, if not sectors of 
production, are being seriously undermined 
and the relative position of the economic and 
social groups is changing significantly. More-
over, if the structural nature of the crisis is not 
recognized in time, especially if the problem is 
viewed as being of a temporary nature, the situ-
ation will deteriorate very seriously. What usu-
ally happens in such cases is that radical mea-
sures are eventually adopted which only deal 
with the problem piecemeal and do not take 
into account what should constitute a compre-
hensive strategy for facing the crisis. Thus, for 
example, when economic and political près-
III 
Structural elements in the solution of the crisis 
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sures made it necessary to apply heavy devalu-
ations to solve the balance-of-payments crisis, 
the solution ofwhich had been postponed, they 
caused serious financial imbalances, explosive 
inflation, and rising unemployment, as well as 
other undesirable effects whereby the prob-
lems were transferred to another sector of the 
economy without any overall approach having 
been taken to deal with them. 
In mid-1982, the situation of many coun-
tries was such that the instruments of economic 
policy could no longer be applied in a marginal 
fashion and it was becoming increasingly evi-
dent that a structural framework was needed 
withing which to manage economic policy, in 
other words, a medium and long-term vision of 
the international situation and of the domestic 
problems pertaining to which priorities might 
be established, at least in connection with the 
sectors or branches of production which were 
to be protected against deterioration or disap-
pearance, and the distribution of costs among 
economic and social groups. Likewise, policy 
schemes should be established for attacking 
the problems with some degree of simultane-
ity; in this regard, it should be recognized that 
in view of the magnitude of the disequilibria, 
the economy cannot function the way it did 
before the crisis and that, therefore, instru-
ments that might be effective in more normal 
times cease to be so and in critical times may 
even be inefficient 
Following is some background informa-
tion which may be useful in devising a structu-
ral frame of reference for a policy option of the 
second type described above, i.e., an option 
based on the view that the current crisis of the 
central countries is not conjunctural in nature 
and aimed at solving the problems of social 
equity and the lack of dynamism which affect 
the Latin American countries. 
The Economic Projections Centre of 
CEPAL7 has prepared several studies which 
explore aspects relating to economic dyna-
mism, income distribution, external economic 
relations and the structure of production, ana-
lysing the requirements and possibilities for 
7
 See, especially, "Latin American Development Pro-
jections for the 1980s", Estudios e Informes de la CEPAL 
No. 6, Santiago, Chile, October 1981. 
achieving a more dynamic, equitable and 
autonomous development. This information 
should be useful in studying the extent to 
which current public action might be oriented 
towards structural considerations rather than 
merely conjunctural ones. In the first place, a 
review is made of some ratios and orders of 
magnitude pertaining to economic dynamism, 
employment and underemployment, sectoral 
productivity and redistribution policies; then, 
a study is made of the orientation that is desir-
able for a trade and external financing policy in 
order to achieve greater economic dynamism 
and greater autonomy in the decision-making 
with regard to the exterior; finally, an estimate 
is made of the needs for industrialization that 
are implicit in this strategy and some questions 
are raised regarding certain key subsectors. 
This background information should be in-
terpreted as an exploration into orders of mag-
nitude, prerequisites and restrictions which is 
designed to provide guidelines for the State 
intervention which seems inevitable under 
present-day conditions. 
1. Dynamism and equity 
One of the central problems with the de-
velopment pattern being applied in the great 
majority of the Latin American countries is that 
it leads to the formation of unjust societies. We 
shall not stress here the controversial subject of 
how the distribution of wealth and of political 
power influenced the distribution of income, 
but shall limit ourselves to pointing out two 
elements we consider vital in determining the 
basis for which any redistribution policy, i.e., 
employment and sectoral differences in the 
product per employed person.8 This does not 
imply disregard for the fact that distributive 
policies and, especially, profound political 
changes can bring about substantial changes in 
the distribution of consumption and income; 
rather, the aim is to describe the challenge with 
which the policy chosen must deal, beginning 
with the current situation in which the families 
8
 The ideal would be to have some way of measuring 
marginal productivity; as an approximation, we shall use 
the product per employed person, which is representative 
of average productivity. 
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that are suffering the most are associated with 
the sectors where unemployment is high and 
the product per employed person is low. 
If a minimum acceptable level of produc-
tive employment is to be established, the level 
of activity must increase. In previous studies, 
CEPAL has already stressed the unusual chal-
lenge which the need to provide jobs for a ra-
pidly growing labour force represents for the 
region. 
In this exercise, the labour force has been 
estimated on the basis of population data which 
make it possible to estimate the active popula-
tion; the proportion of the active population 
that enters the labour force is the result of com-
plex mechanisms linked to different factors, 
such as the labour market, the age structure of 
the population, its geographic location (partic-
ularly with reference to urbanization proces-
ses), the type and duration of education, and 
the participation of women in the labour force. 
In the projections, conservative parameters 
have been used which are based on the assump-
tion that the percentage of the active popula-
tion joining the labour force does not increase 
much over time. 
The product per employed person has 
been estimated separately for the different sec-
tors of the economy and the level is assumed to 
depend on the level of income and on the trend 
in the product per employed person in coun-
tries having a high income level, from which a 
substantial part of the capital goods and tech-
nology used come. Quantitative estimates for 
countries and sectors have been made, by using 
econometric methods, on the basis of data on 
central countries and Latin American coun-
tries. 
In accordance with these criteria, the re-
gional growth rate of the labour force has been 
estimated at an average of 2.8% per year for the 
1980s and around 2.5% for the 1990s. As men-
tioned above, the growth of productivity de-
pends on economic dynamism. Disregarding 
the particular features of different countries 
and sectors, it is estimated that in order for the 
per capita product to grow by 3.3% per year—a 
rate similar to that of the 1960s— the product 
would have to grow at the rate of 5.9% per year 
during the 1980s, and a growth rate of 4.2% for 
the per capita product would call for an annual 
growth rate of 7.3%. In the first case, open un-
employment would be in the order of 10% and 
in the second case, in the order of 5%. 
This first fact gives and idea of the effect 
capital accumulation and economic dynamism 
have on employment. 
If we consider 5% to be the maximum ac-
ceptable rate of open unemployment —and 
bear in mind that a rapid increase of the product 
per employed person over a period often years 
would reduce to an acceptable magnitude the 
difference between the central economies and 
the Latin American economies— we may reach 
the conclusion that 7% is the minimum accept-
able long-term growth rate for the region. 
If the per capita product were to grow in 
the manner postulated above, this would pre-
sent new challenges relating to distribution be-
cause, as is well known, there are at the present 
time considerable differences between sectors 
as regards the product per employed person. 
Indeed, according to a rough estimate, the pro-
duct per employed person in the agricultural 
sector represents around 30% of the average for 
the economy, in the manufacturing industry it 
is practically double the average, in the other 
goods-producing sectors (mining, quarrying 
and construction) and in basic services it is 50% 
higher than the average, and in all other ser-
vices, it is close to the average.9 
The acceleration of growth under the con-
ditions described above would tend to aggra-
vate some disparities, particularly because of 
the rapid growth of the product per employed 
person which is to be expected in manufactur-
ing and in basic services. In respect of the aver-
age, the position of these two sectors would 
improve even more, while the services sector, 
excluding basic services, and agriculture 
would see their position somewhat worsened. 
The main changes in the structure of em-
ployment would still be, fundamentally, a 
transfer from the agricultural sector to the ser-
vices sector (excluding basic services). The 
current agricultural employment rate of 36% 
9
 It should be borne in mind that when the product per 
employed person is used without regard to the relationship 
between capital and labour, the wrong conclusions may be 
reached for particular branches. However, for aggregated 
sectors, the macroeconomic figures are close enough to 
show the overall picture. 
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would drop to 31%, while the rate for services, 
excluding basic services, would increase from 
38% to 43%. The manufacturing sector would 
maintain a share of close to 14%. 
Under such circumstances, the region 
would have a new structure of employment and 
of the product per employed person. A better 
distribution of income would be fostered by the 
reduction of unemployment and underemploy-
ment and of the percentage of the population 
employed in agriculture; on the other hand, the 
growing discrepancies in the product per em-
ployed person would produce the opposite ef-
fect. 
These global figures, despite their being 
aggregated, make it possible to appreciate the 
magnitude of the challenge. The difficulty of 
achieving long-term annual growth rates in the 
order of 7% is a mystery to no one. Although, as 
has been explained above, this dynamism 
would alleviate the problems of unemploy-
ment and underemployment, it would at the 
same time make it absolutely essential to take 
other measures relating to redistribution and to 
capital accumulation. If the Latin American 
economies were to continue distributing in-
come among social groups and between con-
sumption and savings according to the patterns 
ofthe past decade, they would in many cases be 
faced with excessive needs for external savings 
and with increasingly unjust societies. Neither 
the market, which in the words of Raúl Pre-
bisch was neither a temporal nor a social hori-
zon, nor current public policies are capable of 
achieving both the growth objectives and the 
equity sought. Hence the imperative need for 
new policies especially designed to attract part 
of the value added in those sectors where its 
value per employed person is higher and grows 
more rapidly, so as to ensure that a substantial 
part of this income is channelled in the right 
direction. 
2. External economic relations and the 
structure of production 
The increased economic dynamism and 
the problems now facing trade and external 
financing call for changes in external economic 
relations; such changes, in turn, cannot be car-
ried out without affecting to some extent the 
internal structure of production. Following are 
some considerations to be borne in mind in 
formulating a proposal for new internal struc-
tures of production and new external economic 
relations. 
The evolution of foreign trade and the pro-
ductive structure of the Latin American coun-
tries in the postwar period have been dealt with 
in detail in other CEPAL documents. One of 
the central concerns of these studies has been 
the structural inclination towards a deficit in 
the balance of payments resulting from the fact 
that the expansion of production requires in-
creasing amounts of capital goods and interme-
diate inputs of industrial origin. Over the long 
term, the decision to import or produce these 
goods depends on the possibilities of exporting 
other goods or services on terms considered 
beneficial. Traditional behaviour, i.e., the ex-
port of basic commodities, is faced with two 
main difficulties: the serious deterioration of 
the terms of trade, especially in times of crisis, 
and the slow growth of the demand for such 
commodities. Moreover, Latin American ex-
ports of basic commodities have risen at lower 
rates than the world demand, largely because 
of the policy of diversification of the supply 
(investment in other areas) and the protection-
ism of the central countries. Thus, a group of 
countries promoted their economic growth 
through the substituting of industrial imports; 
this was a decision regarding supply which was 
forced on them to a large extent by external 
conditions. From the mid-1960s on, the previ-
ous industrialization process opened the door 
to a new form of decision as to what to produce, 
what to import and what to export. The pos-
sibility of exporting industrial goods, both to 
the region itself and to the rest of the world, 
made it possible inter alia for exports to grow at 
rates similar to or higher than the growth rates 
of the gross domestic product. The economies 
in which the relative importance of external 
trade with respect to the product was declining 
changed their direction and began to 'open up' 
to the exterior; The increase of imported 
industrial goods required by growth was then 
achieved thanks in part to an external trade of 
industrial goods; however, some problems still 
arose. Industrialization does not allow for con-
stant and similar progress to be made in every 
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branch; if advantage is to be taken of external 
markets, there must first be an industrial in-
frastructure and the time needed for installa-
tion and the magnitude of the investment re-
quired present difficult problems of scale. This 
in turn explains the attempts at integration and 
the greater success of those countries which 
managed to make progress in this regard or 
which because of their economic and demog-
raphic size were able in certain stages to handle 
the problems of scale by themselves. 
Beginning in 1973, two new elements 
were added to the factors affecting the equilib-
vium of the balance of payments: the abun-
dance of external financing and the increased 
value of fuels. External financing, which had 
traditionally been used by the region, more 
than doubled in importance relative to the prod-
uct and made it possible, for a relatively long 
period (1974-1980), to support a level of im-
ports which could not have been supported by 
exports alone. The rise in the prices of oil had 
different effects on different countries, since 
some were net exporters, others were net im-
porters and a third group had a relatively balan-
ced external trade in fuels. Most of the coun-
tries resorted, for different reasons, to external 
financing, including the net exporters of oil. In 
the early 1980s, it is difficult to increase the 
debt any more, as the cost of so doing is high 
and the service of the debt is beginning to put 
pressure on the levels of imports. As regards 
the increased price of fuels, the deficit coun-
tries have made great efforts to adjust their eco-
nomies to the new situation by increasing ex-
ports and, in some cases, reducing imports. The 
surplus countries have adjusted their econo-
mies to higher levels of imports relative to the 
product. Therefore, it does not seem likely that 
these two elements could again, during the 
1980s, play the role they did during the period 
1974-1980. On the contrary, they have both 
created the need to increase exports substan-
tially in order to make it possible to maintain 
the relative position of imports and to service 
the debt. This all leads to the conclusion that, 
unless imports can be restricted, the region 
must continue to increase its exports rapidly 
and, for the reasons explained before, such 
growth must be based on manufactured goods 
and must be achieved in the regional and non-
traditional markets. 
In order better to describe these concepts, 
w e shall now look at some data for the region as 
a whole. In making the projections, an import 
product elasticity of somewhat over one has 
been used, although this is lower than that of 
the 1970s; in this respect, is should be recalled 
that because of the lower elasticity of fuel con-
sumption, a global elasticity of more than one is 
especially meaningful. This position is based 
on recognition of the fact that, despite the ex-
pansion of industry, it will be necessary to in-
vest higher proportions of the product than are 
be ing invested now and to have access to ca-
pital goods and inputs which most countries 
cannot easily produce over the medium term if 
each market is considered separately. More-
over, if a reasonable degree of efficiency is to 
be achieved, a certain openness to external 
commercial markets must be maintained. 
As mentioned above, net external finan-
cing increased significantly as a percentage of 
the product, rising from levels of around 2% 
during the 1960s to around 4% in the mid- 1970s 
and 3% towards the end of that decade. 
As a result of this trend, the servicing of 
the debt, which up to 1975 had represented 
about 25% of exports, rose to nearly 45% to-
wards the end of trie 1970s, despite the acceler-
ated growth of exports. The projections show 
that, even with high export growth rates, it 
would be impossible to keep net external finan-
cing at the levels attained since 1974, particu-
larly if interest rates remain at positive real 
levels and if the profile of the debt continues to 
worsen. In this exercise, moderate assumptions 
regarding these last two factors have been used 
and net external financing has been fixed at 
relatively high levels, around 2.7% of the prod-
uct, and in percentages of exports that are clear-
ly higher than those of the 1960s, although 
somewhat lower than those of the late 1970s. In 
this way, the service of the debt could re-
present, as previously, 25% of exports. 
The assumptions adopted for imports and 
external financing mean that the equilibrium of 
the balance of payments will depend on the 
terms of trade and on the growth of the volume 
of exports. Without considering differences be-
tween countries, especially as regards external 
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trade in fuels, a ratio similar to that in force in 
1979 has been assumed. As a point of reference, 
it should be recalled that the index of the terms 
of trade in 1981 was 40% higher than in 1979 for 
the oil-exporting countries, whereas it deterio-
rated by 20% for the rest of the Latin American 
countries. 
In these circumstances, in order to balance 
external accounts, the long-term growth of the 
volume of exports would have to be 8.5% per 
year. If the terms of trade improved by 10% 
during the first years of the decade, the require-
ment for the growth of exports would be re-
duced by approximately 1%. The recent experi-
ence of some Latin American countries, where 
the deterioration of the terms of trade has made 
it necessary to force the growth of exports, pro-
vides a good example of the importance of this 
ratio. 
Therefore, a relatively dynamic growth of 
imports accompanied by a bearable external 
financing and terms of trade which, although 
unfavourable for most of the countries, are 
higher than at present, places the burden of the 
effort on exports. 
To find out whether such a high volume of 
exports can be achieved, we shall now explore 
the implications of such a goal in terms of con-
tent and destination. 
Latin American exports were placed on a 
world trade scenario that is divided into re-
gions: the developed market economies, the 
centrally planned economies, Latin America, 
the OPEC countries (except Venezuela and 
Ecuador) and the rest of developing countries. 
The foreign trade of each of these regions de-
pended on the internal level of activity. While 
it is true that long-term trends tend to increase 
the deficit that has been evident in Latin Amer-
ica's trade in goods, if one takes into account 
what has happened since 1976, one may see 
that the region has reacted to external prob-
lems by increasing its exports at record rates. 
What is significant, in any event, is the dispar-
ity in the growth of the markets for the different 
goods. It is estimated that, with world trade 
growing at average annual rates of between 7 
and 8%, the trade in manufactured goods grew 
at between 8.3 and 9.7%, while the trade of 
commodities only grew between 4.2 and 4.8% 
and fuels grew between 3.1 and 3.7%. 
The region already has a significant share 
of the international commodity market and in 
the past has had to face heavy competition from 
other developing regions, as well as the pro-
tectionism of the centres. The low growth rate 
of the commodity market, together with the 
difficulty of increasing Latin America's share in 
it, would make it impossible to base a growth 
rate of nearly 8.5% on commodities; moreover, 
a great effort will be required to maintain or 
increase, even marginally, the region's share in 
the international markets. The option that is 
considered most acceptable would be to re-
verse, or at least stop, the downward trend in 
the share of commodities (from 17% in 1955 to 
12% in 1980) and raise it slightly in order to 
reach 12.5% in 1990. A similar assumption has 
been made with respect to fuels, which would 
remain at 12%, i.e., with an average annual 
growth rate of 4.5%. 
Therefore, the growth of exports required 
to balance the balance of payments should be 
based primarily on manufactured goods. These 
goods, which represented 1.3% of world trade 
in 1980, will represent 2.4% in 1990; in order to 
appreciate the relative importance of these per-
centages, it must be borne in mind that in 1990 
the world trade in manufactured goods will be 
five times greater than the trade of commodi-
ties. This means that Latin American exports of 
manufactures must increase at average annual 
rates in the order of 17%. 
This new composition of exports would re-
quire a significant restructuring of the destina-
tion of the goods. It is not realistic to think that 
the developed countries are going to change 
their behaviour radically and allow the devel-
oping countries easily to increase their share in 
those markets; moreover, the imports required 
by Latin America create a good market for re-
gional projects, especially pertaining to man-
ufactured goods. Indeed, by 1990, nearly 
two-thirds of imports will be manufactures. If 
the region were to aim by 1990 to supply 30% of 
its imports with goods produced in the region, 
as compared with the present 17%, the 8.5% 
growth of exports would break down into aver-
age annual growth rates of 5.7% for extraregio-
nal exports and 13.2% for intra-regional exports. 
In this way, the composition of intra-regional 
trade would change substantially and manufac-
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tured goods would account for 64% in 1990. At 
the end of the 1970s, the figure was 30%. 
The data and projections just described are 
based on the assumption that there will be sig-
nificant changes in the magnitude, composi-
tion, origin and destination of foreign trade. 
They simultaneously serve two purposes: they 
make a high economic growth rate viable and 
strengthen such growth, and they introduce 
greater symmetry into external economic rela-
tions. Such changes can alter the region's posi-
tion as regards world production and trade, im-
proving it both quantitatively and qualitati-
vely. Thus, the structural modification of exter-
nal economic relations appears to be closely 
linked to changes in the internal productive 
structure. The subject will be discussed on the 
following pages. 
3. The productive structure of the Latin 
American countries 
The discussion on foreign trade has been 
guided by the need to allow for economic 
growth with respect to the supply of imported 
industrial goods and to place the problem of 
financing within manageable boundaries. The 
magnitude of exports is conditioned here by 
the need to strike a balance between the ba-
lance of payments and its composition and the 
dynamism and elasticities of demand. The 
structure of external trade that is implicit in 
these projections must be consistent with the 
internal productive structure, which means 
that the Latin American countries must meet a 
basic requirement: that of having an industrial 
sector capable of supporting the new composi-
tion of exports, since, in quantitative terms, in-
dustrial exports should grow at much higher 
rates than the product. 
This need to industrialize appears even 
greater when one bears in mind the magnitude 
and nature of the domestic demand that is im-
plicit in a more equitable and accelerated 
growth. Investment requirement would gener-
ate a heavy demand for industrial goods, parti-
cularly from the metals and metal products sec-
tor, and the rapid growth of private consumption 
would also increase the demand for such goods. 
While it is true that measures regarding dis-
tribution can modify this trend somewhat, 
there is no question that the demand for indus-
trial goods would grow more rapidly than the 
income. 
Therefore, everything seems to indicate 
that the industrial sector should grow at higher 
rates than the product. In the projections made, 
it is estimated that the manufacturing sector 
would have to grow at an annual rate of some-
what over 8%, which would mean that the sec-
tor's share in the product would be around 30% 
in 1990. 
Industrial growth that met the require-
ments described here should be different from 
that which has been occurring in Latin Amer-
ica. A look at the growth of the domestic de-
mand will show that the expansion of invest-
ment and of private consumption would direct-
ly and especially create pressure on the metals 
and metal products sector, while the projec-
tions for the external trade indicate that those 
export products with respect to which the 
greatest growth should be sought are machin-
ery and transport materials, which should grow 
at annual rates of 21% between 1978 and 1990, 
and whose share of exports would rise from 
4.1%tol6.3%.10 
This growth of the metal and metal pro-
ducts sector would create a substantial addi-
tional demand for basic intermediate inputs. It 
would be essential to develop, among others, 
the branches of ferrous and non-ferrous metals, 
petrochemicals and heavy chemicals particu-
larly considering that the projections for im-
ports do not envisage an accelerated growth for 
this type of goods. In addition, it would be 
necessary to correct the problems of vertical 
integration in the industrial sector, through a 
greater integration of the intermediate and me-
tal and metal products branches. 
It is easy to understand that the growth of 
regional trade and development of branches 
which generally pose problems of scale will 
make it necessary to apply selective criteria. 
Likewise, access to the technology of the cen-
tres is restricted and burdensome, so that in 
choosing an alternative it will be necessary to 
10
 This subject is discussed in greater detail in "Es-
trategia de desarrollo sectorial para los años ochenta: in-
dustria y agricultura", Estudios e Informes de la CEPAL 
No. 9, Santiago, Chile, 1981. 
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examine the prospects on both the internatio-
nal and the Latin American scenes. 
In this connection, many questions arise 
that must be explored. For example, as a result 
of the energy crisis and its repercussions, some 
developed countries seem to have abandoned 
to some extent certain energy-consuming sec-
tors, particularly certain parts of the steel and 
heavy chemicals industry. At the same time, 
the OPEC countries seem to be developing a 
strong chemicals and petrochemicals industry, 
while an examination of the Latin American 
industrialization process shows that between 
1974 and 1980 the bulk of industrial growth was 
based on the development of intermediate 
branches. In this respect, it will be necessary to 
determine what the current Latin American de-
ficits are, what openings might be created as the 
developed countries abandon certain interme-
diate branches and what would be the reper-
cussions of the entry into production of OPEC 
investments. 
A close study should be made of the devel-
opment of the transport materials industry. 
The developed countries are engaged in a tech-
nological barde in this branch and the new 
plants in Europe appear to be achieving cost 
levels comparable to those of the Japanese. It 
would therefore be essential to determine 
whether the existing plants in Latin America 
are adjusting adequately to these innovations. 
In brief, a study of a set of selected indus-
trial branches would be essential in order to 
draw up guidelines for the economic policy 
that is implicit in the industrialization goals 
It might seem out of place, in 1982 when many 
Latin American economies are in the midst of a 
crisis, to take a medium and long-term ap-
proach to the transformation of production, the 
new forms of insertion into the international 
economy and the issue of distribution. 
Nevertheless, with the passing of time, the 
evidence has confirmed the fact that the crisis 
of the central countries is structural in nature 
discussed here. These would indicate the pos-
sible combinations of investment, technologi-
cal innovation and margins of protection that 
have to be established in order to make the 
industrialization process desired a reality. For 
example, CEPAL is currently conducting a 
study on the production and external trade of 
capital goods, the preliminary findings of 
which show the potential for regional develop-
ment that exists in this field.11 
Finally, industrial development should al-
so be considered from a broader sectoral pers-
pective. Agricultural growth would have quite 
a different significance for the countries of the 
region if they increased the use of regional ma-
chinery and raised the value of their commodi-
ties through agro-industry. The same may be 
said with regard to services. It is well known 
that services are expanding considerably in the 
developed countries and that their nature de-
pends to a large extent on their association with 
the goods-producing sectors and especially 
with the industrial sector. As long as part of the 
growth of services is associated with an indus-
trialization process, they will represent actual 
increases in productivity and make a real con-
tribution to the well-being of the population. 
This was the case of the increase in percentages 
of the population employed in services under 
the accelerated growth option described 
above, which is different from the case of the 
increases that took place in some Latin Ameri-
can countries, where they represented a mech-
anism for redistributing income. 
and the data available have shown the pro-
found effect which this crisis has had on Latin 
American societies. As is usual in this type of 
11
 Some preliminary findings are discussed in the arti-
cle by Jorge Beckel and Salvador Lluch entitled "Capital 
goods. Size of markets, sectoral structure and demand 
prospects in Latin America", in CEPAL Review No. X7, 
August 1982. 
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deep-seated external crisis, any change that 
takes place in respect of the disequilibria in the 
balance of payments will in the long run affect 
the parameters under which the economy as a 
whole operates. 
A comparison between the direction 
which changes are actually taking and the di-
rection they should be taking in order to bring 
about a more equitable and dynamic society in 
which decisions can be taken independently, 
will show similarities and disparities. 
There are elements in the changes pro-
duced in the external sector that could be help-
ful in establishing a productive structure that 
would meet the requirements for an external 
trade similar to that proposed above. In effect, 
devaluations, increases in tariffs and other 
measures designed to restore balance or to at-
tain a surplus on the trade balance tend to fa-
vour production for domestic and regional 
markets. Although it is true that, theoretically, 
exports to the central countries should also be 
encouraged, it is well known that this potential 
growth is held back by the protectionism of 
those countries, especially as regards manufac-
tured goods, and by the new drops in the prices 
of commodities which could go hand in hand 
with an increase in the supply. 
For this reason, the measures adopted 
have a more direct effect on the domestic mar-
ket because they provide greater protection to 
those who produce for it; at the same time, one 
of the areas of foreign trade in which there is a 
certain degree of autonomy is that pertaining to 
a possible policy of regional co-operation as 
regards manufactured goods and the govern-
ments are now taking certain measures to pro-
mote such a policy. Nevertheless, three phe-
nomena affecting demand and productive ca-
pacity conspire against these advances: the de-
pression of the domestic markets brought about 
in many countries by measures designed to re-
stric expenditure, the deterioration —not easily 
reversed— of productive capacity in many 
branches as a result of the policies of the 1970s, 
and the magnitude of the financial problems of 
many enterprises, which are further aggravated 
by devaluations. 
There is no question that in most of the 
countries, dynamism has been sacrificed to ex-
ternal balance, although this has been done to 
different degrees in different cases; indeed, 
there are substantial differences as regards the 
will and capacity to reduce and restructure de-
mand. Some countries have tried to replace 
domestic demand by external demand in order 
to avoid a decline in the product and at the 
same time to restore external balance. Other 
countries have tried to restructure domestic de-
mand in order to reduce the demand for im-
ports. Insofar as possible, reserves and import 
substitution have also been used. 
Naturally, the governments that had devel-
oped more active economic policy schemes 
during the 1970s are now able more success-
fully to face the need for restructuring than 
those which based their policy fundamentally 
on macroeconomic tools; likewise, those which 
had developed their manufacturing sector to a 
greater extent now have a greater margin of 
flexibility as regards supply. 
Nevertheless, despite the efforts that have 
been made, the decline of external demand 
from the central countries, the internal finan-
cial disequilibria and the strong dependency of 
certain vital sectors on external supply have 
limited the effect of the measures designed to 
check the fall of global demand. To this is ad-
ded the fact that, unfortunately, measures 
aimed at restructuring demand have not always 
been applied in connection with a supply pol-
icy and on occasions they only seem to be part 
of a chain reaction to unstable external condi-
tions, with serious and not easily remedied 
consequences for the productive sector. Thus, 
in general, the recession has had a very nega-
tive effect on economic dynamism; this has 
been particularly true in the case of employ-
ment and often also in the case of real wages. 
Government policies have attempted, with dif-
ferent emphases, to reduce these undesirable 
effects of the recession on production. How-
ever, it appears that in general the cost of the 
recession has not been distributed with due 
regard to criteria of equity. In the cases where 
high-income groups have continued to receive 
large shares of the income, it does not seem to 
have been channelled towards investments 
capable of sustaining a new structure of pro-
duction; this behaviour is reinforced by the 
prevailing uncertainty and instability. 
Moreover, there are indications that a cer-
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tain amount of that income has been channel-
led towards speculative investment, which in 
general aggravates the external crisis, the pro-
ductive depression, and the productive dise-
quilibria, Thus, there is every indication that 
the current situation has accentuated the exis-
ting inequities. On the other hand, since the 
political process has become more fraught with 
conflict, changes are taking place which in 
some cases favour the return of democratic 
forms, 
In summary, the policies are simultaneous-
ly producing signs of adjustment, redeploy-
ment and transformation. The appraisals of the 
1970s, and the prospective exercises discussed 
clearly show the need for transformation, 
If the orientation mat is implicit in the new 
parameters of the external sector is considered 
by the authorities to be a phenomenon that is 
not conjunctural in nature, if the domestic mar-
kets recover and if regional co-operation efforts 
succeed, the current situation might point to a 
structural change in the orientation of invest-
ment and, consequently, in the productive 
structure of the countries. However, it is still 
too early to determine which of these trends 
will predominate in the current crisis. Because 
of the magnitude of the problems, so evident 
everywhere, and the many opinions and pres-
sures favouring the adoption of an approach 
ranging between adjustment and redeploy-
ment we must conclude by stressing the fact 
that the crisis also offers possibilities. Possibil-
ities, because it has become evident that despite 
the progress made to date, the structural prob-
lems remain; they are still critical and must be 
faced. Possibilities, because many restructur-
ing measures that could not be applied in more 
normal economic situations are now politically 
viable. Possibilities, finally, because circum-
stances are making it clear that, in the face of 
difficulties of this magnitude, it is essential to 
establish political systems that will allow for 
the participation of the majority social groups 
which will, in the last analysis, bear the brunt of 
any structural solution. 
